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The Science and Theory of Empirically Supported
Treatments: A Response to Hughes
Susan M. Sheridan
University of Nebraska—Lincoln
School psychologists work in dynamic contexts, and the conceptual and empiri-
cal bases that shape and inform the fi eld are broad and diverse. As a profession, 
school psychology is concerned with providing services to a broad constituency 
base, with children and youth at the center. Because the work of school psycholo-
gists concerns helping children, there is a huge professional and ethical responsi-
bility to ensure that what we do or the treatments we recommend have the great-
est potential to result in the great est amount of good. It is therefore important to 
understand the extant in tervention literature base including its conceptual under-
pinnings, data-based fi ndings, and contexts to which results can be generalized to 
benefi t the children we serve. Therein lie the strengths of the emerging literature 
on empirically supported treatments (ESTs). Hughes, in her article, “The Essen-
tial Role of Theory in the Science of Treating Children: Beyond Em pirically Sup-
ported Treatments,” [this issue] raises a variety issues around ESTs that warrant 
consideration by theoreticians and empiricists alike. However, several issues can 
be raised as evidence of a need to refocus the discussion back to the science–prac-
tice link.
In this response to Hughes, I will attempt to argue three things. I begin by not-
ing that although I agree with Hughes about the importance of the ory in school 
psychological practice and research, her arguments seem mis focused in sev-
eral ways. Second, I will argue that theory alone is insuffi cient when consider-
ing services for children and families. The implication that somehow theory is 
more important than research does not appear fruitful in advancing our work with 
children. Third, science must be interpreted within the context or framework for 
which it is intended.
* Corresponding author. Email: ssheridan2@unl.edu (S.M. Sheridan).
377
378 SUSAN M. SHERIDAN IN JOURNAL OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY  38 (2000)
Misplaced Focus
In a very articulate manner, Hughes pushes readers to broaden their con-
ceptualization of treatments beyond what “works for kids” in acontextua lized, 
atheoretical ways. However, her arguments seem misplaced in a num ber of ways. 
First, she appears to argue that some theories are more important or accurate than 
others when establishing effective approaches for working with children. Second, 
her main thesis has more to do with the use or misuse of the EST literature, and 
not problems inherent in the EST process per se. Relatedly, she seems to focus 
on a perceived static outcome of the EST movement, rather than appreciating its 
contributions to empiri cal and clinical processes.
School psychology is shaped, if not defi ned, by many theoretical bases that in-
clude, but are not limited to, ecological systems, behavioral, develop-mental, and 
social-learning theories. A realization and appreciation of mul tiple theoretical per-
spectives as they relate to empirically based interventions serves the fi eld well. In 
this issue, Hughes provides a paradigmatic frame-work based on developmental 
psychopathology that is useful for concep tualizing casework with children and 
families. However, this is just one framework.
Implicit in her argument is the notion that empirical intervention studies test 
the effi cacy of treatments devoid of theory. She fails to appreciate that the support 
services and interventions developed from behaviorally based perspectives are, in 
fact, fi rmly established in theory. For example, when considering behavioral ap-
proaches to consultation, she fails to describe the richness of the established con-
ceptual bases of behaviorism and applied be havior analysis (ABA), which implies 
that such approaches are “theoryless.” One need simply note the rich theoretical 
and scientifi c bases on which many interventions lie to recognize their historical 
and contemporary im portance to school psychological practice. To reject such ad-
vances as they relate to “best practices” for children, youth, and families appears 
misguided.
I agree with Hughes’ arguments that intervention research fi ndings in terpreted 
with consideration of salient intrapersonal and contextual vari ables provide es-
sential information to one’s clinical repertoire. This being said, it is important to 
note that it is the psychologist’s responsibility to con sider the use, rationale, con-
ceptual underpinnings, contextual implica tions, and direct and indirect effects of 
an intervention. Blind adherence to one intervention sans these considerations is a 
practice issue and not an issue with ESTs per se. Questioning carefully conducted 
and controlled re-search seems misplaced in this context. At the core of this is-
sue is psycholo gists’ uses or misuses of scientifi cally derived fi ndings related to 
interven tions with children. For example, Hughes’ arguments about a psycholo-
gist recommending time out to a parent with a history of child maltreatment, or 
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the use of interventions with clinical populations for which effi cacy evi dence is 
contraindicative has more to do with clinical malpractice than problems inherent 
in research on ESTs.
It is also unfortunate that the dialogue around ESTs has been misfocused on 
content, when the real strength of this movement is on the scientifi c process (T. B. 
Gutkin, personal communication, 1999). The systematic ap proach by which ESTs 
explore a range of broad interventions, impose em pirical standards, and lessen 
the inferences necessary when moving from research to practice is essential to 
advance our understanding of all the phenomena raised by Hughes. Such scrutiny 
can serve to “raise the bar” for clinicians and researchers alike to understand the 
conceptual, contextual, and empirical bases supporting a particular treatment. The 
solitary focus on product (e.g., an inventory of treatments that are identifi ed as 
empirically supported) excludes appreciation for the process by which scientifi c 
psychol ogists come to explore and advance new understandings that strengthen 
our work with children.
Nowhere to my knowledge do the “conclusions” drawn from EST-related anal-
yses suggest fi nality; rather, as empirical studies are conducted and new under-
standings derived, it is expected that the nature and types of interven tions used 
with children and families will change and evolve. As suggested by Kratochwill 
and Stoiber (in press), “interventions that are supported at one time may be un-
supportable in the future when better research and ex-tensions to other dimen-
sions of a problem become available through em pirical analysis.” The fi eld (and 
our clientele) is extremely well-served by the manner in which the EST move-
ment “pushes the envelope.”
Theory Alone Is Not Suffi cient
Clearly, Hughes is accurate in her argument that theory play a central role in ser-
vices and interventions provided to children, youth, and families. It simply can-
not play the only role. The beauty of theory is that when well-con ceived, it can 
serve as a fi rst step in guiding a clinician’s actions. However, there is a need to 
go beyond theory in our work with children and families. A framework grounded 
in theory alone falls short in its ability to move clini cians forward to a point at 
which they can support their interventions from an empirical perspective. Hughes 
argues that science alone cannot guide the work of clinicians. Similarly, theory 
alone cannot inform and direct clinical actions.
Advances in both theoretical and scientifi c bases must be considered in our 
“front line” work with children. Theory and science together should guide clini-
cians’ decisions. Theory in school psychology cannot exist in a vacuum in the 
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absence of scientifi c scrutiny to serve our constituencies in an ethical and effi -
cacious manner. School psychology has benefi ted im mensely from research ad-
vances within and across related disciplines that continue to inform our practice. 
One quintessential, if not vital direction, is the emerging work in the area of em-
pirically supported interventions.
Research Must Be Interpreted In Context
Questioning aspects of generally accepted practices is a good thing as long as 
the approach to such questioning is grounded empirically. This requires a clear 
understanding of the research context (i.e., the conditions under which relevant 
research is conducted, and representing those conditions appropriately when in-
terpreting the results). In the latter sections of her article, Hughes scrutinizes be-
havioral approaches to consultation and in tervention as overly narrow and insular. 
Arguments for or against a certain approach (in this case, behavioral consultation 
[BC] and ABA) must be framed within the parameters for which it was intended. 
Hughes’ state ments misrepresent ABA and its conceptual bases by ignoring the 
rigorous studies that comprise the discipline, and by suggesting that research 
grounded in ABA purports to do more than they do (i.e., are generalizable across 
all conditions and contexts).
The need to accommodate to children’s individual differences is a recog nized 
need in psychology. Although it is true that “children exhibiting the same prob-
lem behavior may not share the same pathways,” it is not typically the intent 
of behaviorally based consultation and intervention research to uncover differ-
ences in pathways and identify differential strategies to treat them. Nor do BC 
researchers purport such objectives. If the research is studied carefully, consum-
ers will note that in most carefully conducted be havioral research, participants 
are selected following a very carefully con strued and clearly specifi ed evalua-
tion procedure. Selection criteria are painstakingly developed and applied, and 
are based on much more than the topography of a target behavior. Whereas it 
is true that the manner in which a behavior is manifested may be the result of 
varying conditions, these are typically uncovered and controlled in participant 
selection proce dures. Controlling for such individual (and environmental) dif-
ferences, re-searchers are then able to develop, implement, and evaluate inter-
ventions in applied settings. That is, researchers identify and control character-
istics and conditions in common across participants, which allows for a profi le 
approach to clinical inquiry. The profi le is based on specifi ed criteria, such as cli-
ent developmental history, cognitive and learning characteristics, de mographic 
features, familial background, behavioral topography and func tion, clinical diag-
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nostic indicators, and so forth. This complex conceptual ization of child behavior 
and relative responsiveness to intervention argues for more (not less) research on 
ESTs that investigates use of interventions under varying systemic and contex-
tual conditions.
Clinical replication is the cornerstone of moving research into practice (Bar-
low, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986). These procedures are critical in advanc ing applied 
intervention research, not for the sake of ignoring key intra- and interpersonal 
characteristics, but rather to understand them more fully in relation to a carefully 
developed clinical intervention. For Hughes to ig nore this complex essential fea-
ture of behavioral research is unfortunate.
Hughes’ characterization of behavioral consultants as being unaware of the 
complexity of parent—child relationships and conceptualizing children “exclu-
sively from reinforcement paradigms” is also unfortunate. To make her point, 
broad and unfounded speculations are offered that go well-beyond the purpose 
for which research was conducted or fi ndings interpre ted. For example, the study 
by Gmeider and Kratochwill (1998) on compli ance training is offered as an ex-
ample of a narrowly prescribed parent intervention. Although it is true that this 
intervention failed to consider the family’s identifi cation with a broader culture, 
this was not the researchers’ intent. Further, to suggest that the parent participants 
“may have been pre-disposed toward an authoritarian style of parenting, and the 
intervention may have increased their use of control-oriented tactics without pro-
moting their acceptance or autonomy-granting skills” seems quite speculative and 
well-beyond what their data suggest.
The increasing level of sophistication and rigor with which consultation inter-
vention studies have been conducted and the inherent complexity of BC research 
is worthy of careful consideration in the context of ESTs. In a review of consulta-
tion outcome research conducted between 1985 and 1995, Sheridan, Welch, and 
Orme (1996) commented on the importance of well-articulated theoretical under-
pinnings in consultation research. Consultation outcome studies that utilized an 
ill-conceived model of con sultation yielded neutral or equivocal results. Further-
more, these authors found that 46% of consultation studies investigated the effects 
of BC or one of its variants. Fifty-two percent of these used multiple measures to 
assess outcome, and 52% used experimental procedures (of either a group or sin-
gle-subject design) to evaluate effects. Fifty-seven percent assessed con sumer sat-
isfaction, 67% measured social validity, and 43% assessed out-comes at a prede-
termined follow-up period. The authors concluded that “outcomes in these [BC] 
studies continue to be convincingly positive. In fact, considering that the meth-
odological standards are much more rigor ous in BC studies than in those using 
other consultation models, it appears that BC yields the most favorable results” 
(Sheridan, Welch, & Orme, 1996, p. 349).
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Conclusions
At the risk of oversimplifying our fi eld, I contend that psychology is a fi eld that 
is comprised of people helping people. It is a helping profession, which by defi ni-
tion is about doing something for, with, or “to” someone, with the hope of provid-
ing assistance or informing decisions. With the pos sible exception of computer-
based treatments, interventions are not devel oped, recommended, or implemented 
in the absence of the “human touch.” Clinicians are responsible for taking what 
they know based on the ory and research, and generating a meaningful, thought-
ful plan in the changing contexts within which they work. Further, they have a 
fundamen tal responsibility to become increasingly accountable for their services. 
These are very diffi cult tasks. It is the work of researchers to make the re search–
practice link overt, at least partly through the articulation of empiri cally supported 
interventions.
If, for no other benefi t, the EST movement helps school psychologists provide 
appropriate and effective services for children and families, it will serve a critical 
purpose. In a fi eld that is becoming more and more inter vention focused, there 
is an increasing need to help practicing school psy chologists “differentiate what 
constitutes effective practice, [and] provide such services” (Stoiber & Kratoch-
will, 2000; p. 82). The potential pitfalls of the EST movement are not inherent in 
the proliferation of identifying effi  cacious interventions, but are related to misuse 
of the extant literature. Let us hope that researchers and practitioners alike do not 
misdirect energies toward fi nding what is wrong with research advances, but re-
main focused on what is good for children. After all, that is what school psychol-
ogy is about.
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